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CASE EXAMPLE: SOUTH KOREA
SUMMARY
Within the context of continuous conflict and war, the forests of 
South Korea were severely depleted and degraded during the 
first half of the 20th century. The period of Japanese occupation 
(1910–1945) and World War II (1939–1945) resulted in excessive 
harvesting of wood for timber and fuel from South Korea’s forests. 
The Korean War (1950–1953) triggered even more forest loss and 
degradation. By 1952, the nation’s forest growing stocks were less 
than 50 percent of pre-war levels (Lee 2013).
Since the mid-1950s, however, South Korea has restored much 
of its forest area. The nation’s forest cover increased from ap-
proximately 3.5 million hectares from the mid-1950s to 6.4 million 
hectares in 2007, nearly a 3 million hectare gain. Correspondingly, 
forest cover grew from 35 percent to 64 percent of the country’s 
total land area in the same time frame (Bae et al. 2012). Forests not 
only increased in area, but also increased in growing stocks—the 
density of trees or wood biomass per hectare (Table 1). Further-
more, the restored forests have provided many valuable ecosystem 
services. As of 2013, the estimated monetary value of these benefits 
was more than US$92 billion, which is equivalent to approximately 9 
percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Table 2). 
SOUTH KOREA BEFORE
SOUTH KOREA AFTER
TIME PERIOD: 1950s to present
AREA RESTORED: Approximately 3 million hectares,  
nearly 30 percent of the country’s land area
TYPE OF RESTORATION: Primarily active restoration
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WHICH FEATURES AND KEY SUCCESS  
FACTORS WERE EXHIBITED?
The South Korean experience exhibited a number of the features and 
key success factors of forest landscape restoration.
Motivate
The government and landowners became motivated to replant trees 
and allow natural regeneration in lost and degraded forest areas due 
to several factors:
 ▪ BENEFITS. Forest landscape restoration was expected to 
provide a number of economic, social, and environmental 
benefits. From an economics perspective, restoring trees was 
seen in the early days of restoration as a way to meet demand for 
scarce timber and fuelwood. Socially, Koreans have had a strong 
historical cultural connection to forests, in particular pine, with 
stories and traditional handicrafts incorporating trees (Tak et al. 
2007). From an environmental perspective, restored trees would 
curtail erosion and improve water storage capacity. Covering 64 
percent of the nation, South Korea’s mountainous areas have a 
water storage capacity of 18 billion tons, approximately 9 times 
as much as the 1.9 billion ton storage capacity of the Soyang 
River Dam (Lee 2013). Forests on mountain slopes help sustain 
this vast water storage capacity. 
 ▪ AWARENESS. The government initiated a nationwide campaign 
to educate citizens about the benefits restoration would provide 
and to garner widespread commitment for implementation. For 
example, accompanying the launch of the First National Forest 
Plan, the government declared a tree planting period between 
March 21 and April 20, 1973. In addition, the Korea Forest 
Service encouraged citizens to participate in the tree planting 
projects, using posters with the slogan “Let’s plant the nation’s 
green hope in the mountain,” messages on cigarette packs and 
postage stamps, and advocacy via radio broadcasts. The govern-
ment also leveraged national pride with public campaigns utiliz-
ing such slogans as “Planting is loving the nation” and “Cutting 
trees is a menace and planting trees is an act of patriotism” (Bae 
et al. 2012). Moreover, after the liberation of Korea in 1945, the 
government declared a national Arbor Day (April 5), which is still 
celebrated today (Lee 2013).
 ▪ CRISIS EVENTS. Due in part to loss of forest cover, South 
Korea experienced severe flooding events, landslides, and 
regional droughts (KFS 2010). In addition, illegal logging and 
slash-and-burn agriculture proliferated amid the social disorder 
during and after the war periods. Furthermore, drastically 
reduced forest stocks threatened national energy security since 
firewood and charcoal accounted for a majority of total energy 
generation by the mid-century (Bae et al. 2012). 
Table 1 | Changes in Tree Growing Stocks
YEAR GROWING STOCK LEVEL (M3/HA)
1960 9.6
1970 10.4
1980 22.2
1990 38.4
2010 125.6
Source: KFS 2010.
Table 2 | Estimated Monetary Value of  
Forest Benefits
BENEFIT VALUE (USD)
Carbon sequestration and air purification 18.7 billion
Water benefits 22.7 billion
Forest recreation 12.4 billion
Soil erosion prevention 12.2 billion 
Landslide prevention 5.6 billion
Biodiversity conservation 6.5 billion
Forest therapy* 1.4 billion 
Other benefits** 12.8 billion
Source: KFS 2013.
*Invented in Japan, also known as “forest bathing” (considered a natural form of 
aromatherapy).
**Reflects the intrinsic benefits of forests and landscapes. 
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Enable
Many enabling conditions came into place to facilitate restoration of 
forests in South Korea, namely:
 ▪ ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS. At the end of the Korean War, 
forest areas were so degraded that many areas lacked sufficient 
source populations that could underpin natural regeneration. In 
response to this gap, the government put in place a program of 
seedling nurseries, including 460 well-paid nursery experts, who 
produced 500 million seedlings per year (Lee 2013).
 ▪ MARKET CONDITIONS. Since the end of the Korean War, 
competing demands for alternative uses of degraded forest lands 
declined. For instance, the use of wood for energy dramatically 
fell in just 30 years. Whereas wood comprised 90 percent of 
national energy use in 1950, it comprised just 5 percent in 1980. 
The use of lost and degraded forest lands for human settlements 
and small farms declined as well. As the nation industrialized, 
migration to urban areas led to a decline in the nation’s rural 
population from about 16 million in 1950 to about 3 million 
by 2000, further relieving pressure on the land and allowing 
restoration to occur (Bae et al. 2012). 
 ▪ POLICY CONDITIONS. Beginning in 1973, the Korea Forest 
Service designed a series of multi-year “Forest Development 
Plans for Rehabilitation and Restoration” that guided restoration 
with targets, funds, extension, public outreach, and enforcement. 
Goals of each plan vary and build upon those of its predeces-
sors. For instance, the first plan (1973–78) prioritized restoring 
vegetation to denuded land to curtail erosion and other problems, 
the second plan (1979–87) prioritized restoring commercial 
forests for timber and fuelwood, the third plan (1988–97) empha-
sized public benefits such as recreation and wildlife protection, 
the fourth plan (1998–2007) encouraged sustainable forest 
management, and the fifth plan (2008–17) emphasized the role 
of forests in green growth and climate change adaptation (Lee 
2012). In addition to a national plan, restoration has been aided 
by the fact that private property rights are relatively clear and se-
cure in South Korea.1 Approximately 70 percent of the country’s 
total forest area is now in private ownership (FAO 2012).
 ▪ INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS. The national government 
coordinated the activities of national, provincial, and municipal 
governments to ensure alignment of policies and activities among 
them. An early act of coordination came in the mid-1950s, 
when an interagency effort was established to coordinate the 
energy policy of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry with the 
restoration policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Their 
joint efforts contributed to the market conditions described above. 
In particular, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry carried 
out several projects in 1956 to increase the production of coal 
briquettes as a substitute for firewood and charcoal. In 1958, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry banned the inflow of firewood 
into major cities and established designated fuelwood forests. 
In 1973, the Korea Forest Service came under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—a division of government 
more capable of providing local governments with financial, 
administrative, and enforcement support. Another move was to 
ensure that the first National Forest Plan was synchronized with 
other policies, including the Economic Development and National 
Comprehensive Land Development Plans (Bae et al. 2012).  
 
Traditional culture was leveraged to act as a motivating force 
to organize people and reinvigorate traditional institutions. A 
traditional sustainable forest management system—songgye, 
effectively community forestry (Tak et al. 2007)—formed nearly 
300 years ago was reinvigorated.2 The main role of a songgye 
as a resource management organization was to provide three 
important types of public infrastructure: community rules, 
provision management (fuelwood, etc.), and monitoring of rule 
compliance and sanctioning of unauthorized activities (Chun 
and Tak 2009).
Implement
During this time period, capacity and resources for implementation 
came into place that facilitated restoration, including:
 ▪ LEADERSHIP. Leadership in visioning and implementing forest 
landscape restoration came from the highest levels in South Korea. 
President Park Chung-hee, who served from 1963 to1979, was 
the first leader to make reforestation a national priority and was a 
champion of restoration during his tenure. Among other actions, 
he emphasized in his public addresses that planting trees was an 
act of patriotism that would make the nation strong. He mandated 
the planting of 0.5 hectares of fuelwood forest per household and 
encouraged villages to reestablish community cooperatives to 
revitalize cooperation and successful forest restoration (Lee 2013). 
 ▪ FINANCE AND INCENTIVES. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
foreign aid from the United States helped South Korea’s economy 
recover from the war era, and at times accounted for as much 
as 8 percent of South Korean GDP (Mason 1980). This level of 
overall economic development assistance created space for the 
country to provide incentives toward restoration. The government 
financed forestry experts to provide guidance so that restoration 
would create income opportunities for rural citizens (Lee 2013). 
Local government also guaranteed the purchase of seedlings and 
saplings from village-operated tree nurseries (Bae et al. 2012). 
In 1976, the World Bank gave a $4.2 million loan over a 25-year 
period to support establishing fuelwood forests (Lee 2013). 
 ▪ TECHNICAL DESIGN. The techniques applied follow the goals 
outlined in the Forest Restoration Plans. Historic restoration encour-
aged planting of coniferous trees, which now constitute about 57 
percent of the restored area. Restoration goals have evolved over 
time: efforts are now under way to increase the diversity of tree spe-
cies in the restored forest landscapes for the sake of biodiversity and 
mitigation of pest and disease risk (FAO 2012). 
LOOKING FORWARD
Between 1953 and 2010, South Korea’s forest cover increased 
almost two-fold and tree density increased thirteen-fold, while the 
country’s population doubled and the economy grew twenty-five-
fold in real terms.3 In many respects, restoration in South Korea  
has been a huge success. Several factors, however, should be noted 
as caveats:
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 ▪ INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS. Whereas South Korea is a 
democracy, the government was largely authoritarian between 
1953 and 1988. This characteristic enabled swift changes in 
institutional and policy conditions (CBO 1997). It also enabled 
conditions that abused human rights. For example, the Tempo-
rary Act of Forest Reclamation enacted in early 1963 enabled 
forced unpaid labor in the fuelwood forests. A 1977 report by the 
CBS News Corporation highlighted corruption and forced labor 
regarding forest restoration. UN FAO inspections in the 1980s led 
to such practices being diminished through a fear of exposure. In 
addition, the rise of more robust democratic practices led to more 
accountability and citizen participation (Lee 2013). 
 ▪ TECHNICAL DESIGN. To create rapid restoration and produce 
economically viable forests, government policy focused on 
planting coniferous forests. Due to this, the tree age structure in 
many South Korean forests is not yet varied. The lack of species 
diversity and age structure has led to increased susceptibility 
to pest and disease outbreaks in recent years (FAO 2012). 
Moreover, Pinus rigida4 is a native species of eastern North 
America, and does not grow as well in Korea; the dense needles 
do not decompose well and also block water from penetrating 
the soil (Tak et al. 2007). Mature forests—over 60 years of 
age—are rare. In order to combat this risk, efforts are under 
way to increase non-coniferous forest area and enhance species 
diversity (FAO 2012), such as planting a range of pine species, 
oak and non-timber forest products such as chestnuts, pine nuts, 
jujubes, and walnuts (Tak et al. 2007). Such efforts, coupled with 
more designated protected areas, are projected to have positive 
impacts on biodiversity (FAO 2012), which will need to be the 
focus in the next stage of South Korea’s restoration plan  
(Tak et al. 2007).  
 
Currently around 84 percent of South Korea’s wood needs are 
supplied by imports (KFS 2013). Korea is among the major 
destinations for timber exports from countries most badly 
affected by illegal logging. Despite its designation as the world’s 
fifth largest consumer of illegally sourced wood (after China, 
Japan, the United States, and the EU), there has been almost 
no domestic or international attention paid to South Korea’s 
role as a consumer of illegal wood, limited campaigning work 
by nongovernmental organizations, either domestically or 
internationally, and limited coverage in the local or international 
media (Lawson 2014). Commercial timber production has been 
and still is the central goal of the Korea Forest Service since its 
inception in 1967 (Tak et al. 2007); however, this is yet to be 
realized.5
 
 ▪ MARKET CONDITIONS. Population pressure is a challenge 
that has to be managed in restoration efforts. For example, 
between 1970 and 2005 the forest area declined by 218,000 
hectares.6 Rapid economic growth along with industrialization 
and urbanization led to increased demand for land for housing, 
factories, and roads. To meet these increased demands, forest 
lands were converted to other land uses (FAO 2012).
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ENDNOTES
1. Traditionally, all land belonged to the king and was granted by 
him to his subjects. The Japanese conducted a comprehensive 
land survey between 1910 and 1920 in order to place 
landownership on a modern legal footing. Farmers whose 
families had tilled the same soil for generations but could 
not prove ownership in a way satisfactory to the colonial 
authorities had their land confiscated. Land reform was 
carried out by the United States and South Korean authorities 
between 1945 and 1950. The institution of private property 
was retained, but the American occupation authorities 
confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese 
colonial government, Japanese companies, and individual 
Japanese colonists. The Korean government carried out a 
reform whereby Koreans with large landholdings were obliged 
to divest most of their land. A new class of independent, family 
proprietors was created (Savada and Shaw 1990). 
2. Although the tradition was brought to an end by the war, it is 
still remembered in the cultural and institutional memory of 
the rural community. When Korea needed the tradition in the 
late-1960s, it was brought back to life to play a critical role 
in the success of reforestation. Songgye was originally an 
organization to protect local forests, but its tradition became 
a powerful organization to rehabilitate the denuded Korean 
landscape in the 1960s (Chun and Tak 2009).
3. GDP data for 1960 (earliest year available) and 2010 is 
from the World Bank (n.d.), calibrated to 2005 in constant 
U.S. dollars. World DataBank. Available at:<http://databank.
worldbank.org/ddp/home.do>. [Accessed August 1, 2014.]
4. Pinus rigida is a major tree species used in restoration. It was 
the fourth most populous species of tree in terms of land area 
in 2007 (Tak 2007). 
5. Of the 2.1 million forestland owners, twenty-three do use 
their forests for commercial timber production. For the most 
part, trees throughout Korea are still too small for saw log 
production, and the poor wood quality of both native species 
and non-native species limits the range of forest products (Tak 
et al. 2007).
6.  Area declined from 6,612,000 hectares to 6,394,000 hectares.
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